The constitutional status of the dependencies of the United States, and its bearing on civil rights therein by Gallaher, George P.
GALLAHER
Constitutional Status of the
Dependencies of the U. S.
4 -1
Political Science
A. B. >.:::x.„
1W.lV):);aaT
11.1. . jjuuApy

1^*
4t y
^ ^ ^
" ^ "
'
# ^
r:
^ 4^^ 4- 4^ ^
^4- 4^ ^
^ f ^
1^ ^'
* # # # # # .
^- 1*^ # # f^' 4 ^ ^
^v-#.- # ^ ^ ^- ^ , ^ ^ # ^ ^ ^ ^

THE CONSTITUTIONAT. STATUS OP THE DKPENDKNCIKS OF THl^; UNITED
STATES, AND ITS BEARING ON CIVIL RIGI-^TS TH1?;REIN.
By
George P. Gallaher.
THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF
BACHELOR OF ARTS
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
IN THE
COLLEGE OF LITERATURE AND ARTS
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.
FJ^Y 26TH, 1905.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
So 190
ENTITLED
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY
IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF /2-^5c--c^^ ^^L::::::^^^^
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF..
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/constitutionalstOOgall
INTRODUCTORY
.
Hardly any constitutional question has been more contin-
ually before the American people since the establishment of our
national government, than what shall be the status of nev/ly acquired '
I
territory and the civil rights of the inhabitants. Ours has been an '
i
expandin£ nation. Even during the period of its forn;ation, nego-
;
tiations were on foot vAiich finally led to the cession, by the states
to the Federal Government, of their claims to the Northwest Territory.
This cession is not important because of any increase of territory;
j
there had been simply a transfer of title from one part of the govern-
mental system to another part. The claims of the colonies to all
land east of the Mississippi river had been clearly established be-
fore this. The thing which most concerns us here was the system of ij
government created for the territory by the Ordinance of 1787. En-
j
acted, as it was, during the dying moments of the old Confeders-t ion, '
it stood, nevertheless, for a hundred years and more, as the basis
for territorial legislation. Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, Ala-
|
bama, the Mexican conquests, and to a certain extent, Alaska, were
|
governed, at first, by provisions identical to those laid down by it,!
and in accordance with the principle therein established. It was not
until the last decade of the nineteenth century, that a situation
arose so different from any former one, that the old policy of deal- ^
ing with territorial acquisitions v/as found to be insufficient, and
^|
'i
that a nev/ method was adopted.
j
There were two essential elements of difference in the new
situation. The first was, that until the year 1898, with the ex-
ception of Alaska, the extensions of our national domain had been '
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j
over contiguous territory. The second point was, that the clvlllz-
; at ion of the Inhabitants thus acquired was such that they might rea-
sonably be expected to quail IV themselves for citizenship and self-
|
I
government in a comparatively short time. The state of civilization
which they had reached, their habits and customs, their religious be-
liefs, in fact, all those things which give to a race its distinguish
ling characteristics were not essentially different from our own. The
one exception to this general statement was, as has been said, Alaska.
Theife, the presence of the native tribes necessarily complicated in
some degree the question of governmental policy. Yet these native
i| tribes were few in number, and required practically the same treat-
ment as did the Indiana of the v/estern states. '!
Even v/hen the Hawaiian Islands were annexed in 1898, the
j
presence therein of a large number of civilized white persons; the
ihigh plane of civilization which the natives in general had reached,
and the existence, already, of a republican form of government in the
islands made the question one, not of constitutional sta,tus, but of
i international and political policy.
j
The treaty of 1898 with Spain, however, left us in a much
more serious dilemma. As to Cuba, # we had at the outbreak of war
fwith Spain, disclaimed all intention of exercising sovereignty, jur-
Ijisdiction or control over the island except for the pacification
ithereof, and had asserted our determination to leave its goverrjnent
|
;and control in the hands of its people. The title to Porto Rico, and
i
the Philippine Islands, had been vested by the treaty in the United
|
I
States; it had given us complete sovereignty over them; and thrust
upon us the duty of establishing some form of civil government, and
|
||malntalning peace and order therein^ Here is where the difficulty
# 30 Stat .at L. pp, 738-739

njit
|lay« The Philippine Islands are separated from us by thousands of
miles of ocean; we were then not quite sure whether we oughi to re-
tain possession of them; give them their independence, perhaps under
a protectorate; cr turn them over* to some other nation v/hich was more
experienced in governing colonies than ourselves. Porto Rico lay nb.),r
to our shores, and the expediency of retaining possession of it, was
'Inot seriously questioned. There were, however, in both territories,
a. considerable body of natives of varying degree of civilization.
Those of Porto Rico gave evidence, under American guidance, of becom-
ing capable of such local self-govermaent as is given to organized
jdomestlc territories of the United States, though their conception of
lithe principles underlying free institutions of government was narrow,
'to say the least. Those of the Philippine Archipelago ranged from
the partially civilized native, as found in and around the city of
Manila, to the semi-savage Mohaimnedan Moros and the Cannibal tribes
of the southern islands. Whether these would ever be fitted for lo-
cal self-government was and is yet a much debated question.
The experiences of foreign nations in similar situations
have not been assuring. Especially is this true of the English ex-
iperience in India; and the conclusion which has been reached there is
that while the government must be carried on in the interest of the
i native population, and in accordance with their habits and customs,
it must nevertheless always be carried on by Englishmen. American
institutions are the result of centuries of growth, and of Anglo-Saxon
genius for government. It would be idle to suppose for a single mo- I
^ment that these institutions could be suddenly and successfully trans
''planted to the islands of Porto Rico and the Philippines. Some mod-

Ificatlon of the American system therefore seemed necerjsary, '
But the makers of t?ie Constitution apparently had not taken i
into consideration the possibility that the government which they
were establishing for Americans would sometime be called upon to rule
over a country and a people so far removed from us, in physical dis-
I
^tance, race, and civilization. There is no specific provision in that
•instrument for such an emergency; if authority were £:lven at all, it
must be found in the general clauses, and in the natury of the govern
.mental system. The legislative and executive branclaes of the govern-
jment have found what they consider to be sufficient constitutional
li
<!
i
authority for the necess-.ry modifIccct ion, and their conclusions have
been supported by a majority of the Supreme Court, but, as Professor '
Burgess has pointed out ;# the four strongest members of that body, not
only voted in the minority in a case in which the question was in-
j
jivolved, but supported their conclusions by powerful dissenting opin-
j
ji I'i
lions. The gravity of the situation is at once evident, and conclu- i
!'
. 'I
slons can properly be drawn only after a careful consideration of
both sides of the question. The purpose of this paper will be to
jistate as clearly and fairly as possible, the arguments for and against
j;
the principle on which the government is now proceeding, together
with the bearing of that principle upon the status of the dependen-
cies; the civil rights of their inhabitants; and the conclusions
which seem to be warranted from the facts.
# Political Science Quarterly, 19ol.vOl 16, p 486

As has been said, at the close of the war with Spain, the
title to the Philippines and Porto Rico, tO£;ether with absolute sov-
ereignty and control over t:iese islands, was, by the treaty of peace,
vested in the United States. The power of the United States thus to
acquire territory had been definitely settled both by long estab-
flished precedent, and by judicial decision. We are a sovereign na-
tion; the Constitution confers upon the national roverninent the por^ver
to carry on war, and to make treaties. Acquisition of territory is
often a logical if not an essential feature in the exercise of these
powers, and has therefore been held by the courts to be constitution-
al .
ll
The signing of the treaty brought peace between the bellig-
erent forces of Spain and the United States. If left, however, the
government of the newly acquired territories in the hands of the mil-
itary authorities. This also was justified by precedent and author-
^itative judicial decision; the acknowledgement of our sovereignty by
Spain did not necessarily mean that the inhabitants of ihe ceded ter-
ritory would quietly acquiesce in the cession. A state of war had
existed; the control of the United States authorities must be made
effective; and above all, Congress must be given sufficient time in
which to devise a scheme of government, before the military adminis-
tration could be displaced by the civil. The acquisition of Louisi-
ana, Florida, and the Mexican territories had, in each case, been
followed by a period of military government.
The real difficulty lay in the form of civil government
which should be given in this case. Treaties of cession heretofore
had contained certain stipulations in regard to the future disposal
of the inhabitants concerned. That with France in 1805, for the pur-
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Ichaae of Louisiana 3aid;#"The Inhabitants of the ceded territory
iShall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and ad-
mitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Peder-
b.1 Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rirhta, advanta.gef3, and
immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime,
they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property, and the religion they profess."
I
Practically the same provision is found in the treaty with
Spain (1819) ceding Florida; the treaty of peace with MexicS (1848)
[Ceding California and New Mexico; and the treaty with Russia (1867)
whereby Alaska was acquired. That of 1898 with Spain, Article 9, de-
jclared that: "The civil rights and political status of the native in-
jhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall
,
Ii
be determined by the Congress." Spanish inhabitants were to be al-
j
lowed a certain time in which to elect citizenship, being perfectly
jfree to retain the old or accept the new. The United States was thus
I
;
left with a free hand, so far as treaty obligations were concerned,
j
land might do as it willed with the new possessions. Yet not entirely
as it willed, for there was on one side, the Constitution, and on the
lother, the people of the dependencies to be considered. Given a lib-
eral allowance of time for Congress to erect civil governments, it
was still plain that these people would not then be fitted for such
S
:
i|a measure of free and local self-government as had heretofore been
given in the other cases. On the other hand, the Constitution con- !
tained certain clauses, relative to due process of law in Judicial
j
proceedure, the collection of customs duties and internal revenue
Jiaxes, and the maintainance of republican forms of government, all or
some of which seemed impossible of application. The position of the '
# Art .3, Treaty 8 U .3 .Stat ^ 2oO-2o2

Islands was more nearly that of the colonial po sessions of European
nations,
Ij
The first definite action taken by Congress, was the passing
of the so-called Poraker Act # of April 12th, 1900, Thi3 act was vir-
tually a constitution for the island of Porto Rico. It provided for
a Governor, to be appointed by the President, by and with the con3ent
of the Senate; an Executive Council, appointed in the sarne way, for
the term of four years unless sooner removed by the President, and
composed of a Secretary, Attorney Genoral, Treasurer, Auditor, a Com-
missioner of the Interior, a Commissioner of Education, and five na-
tive Porto Rican members, A House of Delegates, composed of 55 mem-
bers, chosen from seven districts of the island, for a term of two
years, was also provided. These two bodies, the Executive Council and
the House of Delegates, were together to form the Legislative Assera-
bly of Porto Rico,
||
The sessions of the Assembly were limited to sixty days in
length; the first session was to be called by the Executive Council,
'which was also to provide the manner of election of members for the
lower house. Extra sessions might be called by the Governor, Mem-
\
bers of the House of Delegates must be 25 years of age; able to read
and write either the Spanish or the English language, and posessed of!
I
ii
la certain amount of taxable property,
J
The Governor was given a veto power v/hich, however, could be
over-ruled by a majority of two-thirds in each house. The power of
local legislation was given to the Assembly, with the exception that '
franchises were to be granted by the Executive Council, and all laws
J
were to be subject to the final consideration and repeal by the Con-
|
gress,
-I * I
31 Stat, at L.,p 77.

Suffrci£je was limited only to citizens of Porto Rico of one
I
years bona fide residence therein. People thus qualified were to be
known as citizens of Porto Rico, (not of the United States). A res-
ident commissionor to tho United States was to be appointed, his sal-
ary being paid by the latter government; and aCommission of three mem
bers, of vi^ich one must be a native Porto Rican was to report on a
permanent system of government
.
j|
It was also enacted that the tariff on goods entering the
island from a foreign country was to be the same as that on the same
goods entering the United States, except that the rate on coffee was
to be five ( .05/) per pound and that Spanish books were to be admitted
free. As between the United States and Porto Rico, the tariff rates
were to be but 15 per cent of those on foreign goods, and even that
|
rate was to cease after March 1st, 1902 or as soon as a system of
|
local taxation could be put in force. These duties were in no case
'
to be pai d into the general fund of the United States, but were to
be kept separate and used by the President for the benefit of Porto
Rico. So soon as a civil government was established, these duties
were to be paid into the local treasury. This rule was to apply to
those duties collected upon Porto Rican goods coming into the United
States, as well as upon United States products coming into Porto Rico.
Porto Rican vessels were to be naturalized, "and the coast-
ing trade between Porto Rico and the United States was to be regula-
ted in accordance with the provisions of law applicable to any two
'great coasting districts of the United States."
j
;
Section 16 of the Act, also, runs as follows:- "All judicial
process shall run in the name of the 'United States of America, ss;
the President of the United States', and all criminal or penal pros-

editions in the local courts shall be conducted in the name and by
the authority of "The People of Porto Rico»; and all officials author-
ized by this act shall, before entering upon the duties of their res-
pective offices, take an oath to support the Constitution of the
United States and the lawsr of Porto Rico."
A regular system of courts was established and provision
made for appeals to be taken from the supreme court of the Island to
\
that of the United States, Porto Rico was erected into a Judicial
district of the United States, and the supreme Court of the Island
was given the power and functions of a United States circuit court.
;
This detailed analysis of the Foraker Act is given in order
!
i
that later references to it may be clearly understood. It is at once
apparent, from \^at has been said, that if Porto Rico were considered
as a part of the United States in the ordinary sense of the term, that
J
clause in the Constitution which provides that "all duties, imposts,
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States" (Art .1,
Sec.8) has been grossly violated. The theory hovvever, upon which
I,
!|Congress acted in the matter seems to have been that there may be
territory within the boundaries of the United States, and under its
sovereign power and control, which, nevertheless, has not been incor-
porated into the Union, and which is therefore not a part of the
United States within the meaning of the uniformity and certain other
jj
I
clauses of the Constitution. I
I
Practically the same principle was adopted in the act to
;j
'i
ii
provide a civil administration for the Philippine Islands, passed
I|
July 1st, 1902, The tariff rate was fixed at 75 per cent of the |1
regular foreign tariff as provided in the Dingley Act, the calling of
an elected legislative assembly was delayed until peace was estab - I
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j
111 shed in the major part of the Islands; and a somewhat larger dis-
cretion was given to the Philippine Commission than had been given to
the Executive Council of Porto Rico. Such chan^^es as were made were ;
I
:thus merely those of detail to suit the different conditions prevail-;
Ing in the eastern posessions.
I
The position of the legislative department of the govern-
ment being determined, let us turn to that of the Judiciary, for with
i
;the Supreme Court rests the final determination of the constitution-
ality of Congressional acts:-
' In the first case Involving thi :3 question - that of De Lima
vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. - the question before the court was: "Can the
United States government continue to collect the ordinary duties on
i
merchandise from foreign countries upon the like merchandise coming
I
from Porto Rico into the ports of the United States after the estab-
j
llshment of the sovereignty of the United States in and over Porto I
Rico, and the assumption by the United States of governiaent and Jurls-
Pdiction therein and thereover."
jj
The answer of the court was clear and unqualified: "The law
of the land ... is, as I have said, that, when the sovereignty of the
Ijunited States and the Jurisdiction of the United States government
became established over any territory, district, or country by a com-
pleted treaty of cession, accompanied by posesslon, that territory, dls
[i
jbrict or country ceases in all respects to be foreign to the United
LStates, and becomes domestic for all purposes, and all the laws of
the United States in respect to the relations to foreign countries 1
i!
Cease immediately to have any application to such territory, district
Ibr country, or any force in regulating its relations or the relations
of its Inhabitants to the other parts or the inhabitants of the other
II
'
li

tl
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parts of the United States."
' In the case of Dooley vs United States,# the question invol-
ved was whether these duties might be levied upon merchandise coming
into Porto Rico from the United States. Until the ratification of the
freaty of peace, such duties had been collected by the American mil-
itary authorities in the Island, This action, however, was based on
the theory that the Spanish soveriegnty remained, though dormant, in
the Island, until Spain herself relinquished that sovereignty. Such
^
had been the interpretation placed upon the matter by the Supreme
Court in the cases of Fleming vs Page, (9 How. 603), and Cross vs Har-
rison (16 How.164). The first of these cases involved the right of
the United States to levy duties upon merchandise coming from the Mex-
ican city of Tampico, while that city was in the posession of the i
American forces during the Mexican War. Had the right to levy these
|
1
duties been denied, it vould have followed necessarily that Tampico
was a part of the United States; and that it had been made so by the
[
President thereof acting in his capacity of commander-in-chief of the
naval a.nd land forces of the United States, and without any action
whatsoever upon the matter by Congress. Such power to enlarge the
boundaries of the United States has never been given to the President
:|
and he cannot exercise it. So in the case of Cross vs Harrison it was
held that the duties imposed by the Am.erican military governor of
California at SanFranciscc, during the continuation of the war with
Mexico, might be such as the military authorities saw fit to make
jjthem. But, the later action of that governor in putting in force the
regular United States schedule of duties immediately upon receipt of .,
the knowledge that California had been ceded to the United States,
jsven though it was done without the express direction of Congress,
# Sec. 182, U.S.Reports.
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was held to be valid.
j
On the ground of these two decisions, therefore, the impo-
Dition of duties on goods coming from the United States into Porto
$ico, during the continuation of the war with Spain was held to be
|valid. But immediately upon the cession of Porto Rico by Spain to the
United States, the military order imposing these duties, according to
the opinion of the Supreme Court in Dooley vs The United States above
Ipited, "ceased to apply to goods imported from the United States....
^nd that until Congress otherwise const itut ionally directed, such
jjnerchandise v;as entitled to free entry."
I
A little lat^-;r, in the case of Huss vs The New York & Porto
Rico Steamship Company, it was decided that Porto Rico had been
|
brought, by the treaty of 1898 v/ith Spain, within the coasting lav;s
Ipf the United States. i
I,
11
I
Thus far, the action of the Supreme Court seemed to indic8.te
^hat tha^t body was holding to the idea that v/herever the power of the .
jUnited States Congress goes, there also is the Constitution, extended
thither ex proprio vigore . The court itself, however, was divided on
the matter, four of the justices being found in the minority. Just
at this juncture, there came the great case of Downes vs Bidwell al-
ready referred to, and involving tbe question of the power o^
to impose duties between the United States and Porto Rico. Until
this time, it seems that the constitutionality of the Foraker Act had i
not been called into question, the discussion merely involving the
condition of affairs precedent to any action on the part of Congress.
Now, however, we find what seemis to be a reversal of the decisions
cited above in the De Lima and Dooley cases, and a fran_k statem.ent
that the duties there declared unlav;ful, may be levied by the Congress,

|l should It see fit to do so. The apparent chance of front was caused
l|
by the action of one Justice only. Heretofore, the Chief Justice,
Justices Harlan, Brev/er, Peckham and Brov/n had constituted the major-
ity of the Court. Now, v/e find Justice Brown acting with the other
four members, Justices Shiras, White, McKenna and Gray, thus con-
stituting a nev\! majority. We do not wi :3h to doubt Justice Brov/n* s
(Consistency; that question is aside from the one under discussion, and
waive it here.
Let us proceed at once to an examination of the opinions,
|both concurring and dissenting, handed dovm in the case. Justice
I,
prown gave the opinion of the Court. The kernel of his argument is
^tound in the statement that: # "Y/e are, therefore, of opinion that
the Island of Porto Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to
tthe United vStates, but not a part of the United States within the
revenue clauses of the constitution; that the Foraker Act is con-
jStitutional, so far as it Imposes duties upon imposts from such
I!
|j sland
This position is supported by the following six definite
jproposit ions: -
!
1. The District of Coliunbia and the Territories are not
within the Judicial clause of the constitution which gives
to the United States Courts Jurisdiction in cases arising
i
I
between citizens of different states, i
2. The Territories are not states within the meaning of
Revised Statutes, 709, permitting writs of error from this
court in cases involving the validity of a state statute.
^
3. The District of Columbia and the Territories are
states in regard to their relations with foreign countries.
# I
See 182 U.S.244
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4. The Territories are not v/lthln the clause of the Con-
stitution providing for a Supreme Court, and such inferior
courts as Congress may see fit to establish. ^
5. The Consular Tribunals of the United States are not
under the Constitution. !l
6. If the Constitution has been extended to any Terri-
tory by the Congress, then It Is in full force and effect in
that Territory.
||
These propositions, Justice Bro'jvn considers to have been estab-
lished by various acts and judicial decisions made and given since
the foundation of our national government. The decision of Chief
Justice Taney in Scott vs Sanford,(19 How.446) to the effect that
"There is certa.inly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States, or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleas-
ure", he considers as greatly Impaired by the result of the Civil War
which settled affirmatively the pov/er of Congress to deal with the
territories as seer s best to It. 'I
Furthermore, he declares that there Is no middle ground be-
tv/een the old doctrine o f ex ^JovviCL vj-go^Q> s-nd v/hat might be called
the "American Empire" as enunciated by John Marshall. In this Amer-
ican Eiiapire there are certain principles of natural justice Inherent
in the Anglo-Saxon character v/hlch would work against v/anton oppress-
ion, and for equitable government.
"To sustain the judgement in the case under consideration, it
by no means becomes necessary to show that none of the articles of the
Constitution apply to the island of Porto Rico. There is a clear dis-
tinction between such prohibitions as go to the very root of the
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|i power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place, and
such as are operative only 'throughout the United States* or among
the several states. Thus when the Constitution declares that »no bill
of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed*, and that »no title
of nobility shall be granted by the United States*, it goes to the
competency of Congress to pass a bill of that description. Perhaps
the same remark may apply to the first amendment, that 'Congress
|j.
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people to peacefully assemble and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances*. We do not v/ish however, to be misunderstood
as expressing an opinion how far the bill of rights contained in the
Ijfirst eight amendments is of general and how far of local application."
Returning to the question in this particulcr case. Justice
'iBrown brings up the argument that a tax on imposts is necessc^ry. The
island of Porto Rico is already burdened with a debt of $30,000,000;
l^nd a system of local taxation can not be put in force for eit least
i'two years. The people are not used to direct taxation; the impo- ||
sition thereof in amount sufficient to provide for the expenses of
the government would involve a tyranny worse than that of the Spanish
rule, and perhaps cause great disturbances. j
And as a concluding statement, he says that the United States
as a sovereign nation should be posessed with power in dealing with
acquired territories equal to, or in the same as that posessed by
other nations. '
His central idea therefore, is, as has been intim.ated, that
[the United States may have sovereignty and control over certain lands
||and peoples, to vidiich however, the Constitution has not been extendedj
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ty Congress, and in the government of v/hich Congress is not con-
I trolled by that instrument.
I
It is worthy of notice here that, while the rem<:,ining Jus-
'tices of the majority concurred in the result at v/hich Justice Brown
arrived, namely, that Congress could levy the duties betv/een Porto
Rico and the United States, they by no mean6 concurred in the reason-
|ing by vi^iich he arrived at that result. We cannot enter at length
i!
,1
jlnto their argument; their reasoning may be summed up in a few sen-
tences. It is, that the government of the United States is born of
the Constitution, and all power is derived from that instrument. In
dealing with the territories, Congress is governed by all parts of the
Constitution v/hich are applicable, and derives its pov/er from that
clause which says that "Congress shall have power to dispose of and
make all rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property of the United States." They cite Cuba as £-.n example, a.nd
say: (182 U.S.345), "It is lawful for the United States to take po-
session of, and hold in the exercise of its sovereign power, a par-
ticular territory; v/ithout incorporating it into the United States."
We turn now to take up the argument of the dissenting Jus-
tices. In regard to it, Professor Burgess says,# in substance, that
it is the path of reason and sound Judgement, as compared with the
winding and devious v/ays which have been threaded by the Court, The
position of these Justices may be stated briefly as follows: All
branches of the government are lim.ited by the constitution; they can-
not act beyond its Jurisdiction. Wherever Congress has the power to
legislate, or v/herever the sovereignty and Jurisdiction of the United
States extends, there also is the Constitution, extented thither
|j
by its own force, and compelling conformity with its provisions.
# Po1 i t i calT'Sci^nce ^^uarterly 16:486.
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Such is the law as it is found, and to Interpet it otherwise is to
amend the Constitution by Judicial construction when another way has
been expressly provided.
We cannot here give all the arguments and Judicial decisions
iwhich were cited in order to prove this conclusion. Two points only
'will be taken up, and these because they are the chief ones in the
lease. First, as to the violation, by the Foraker Act, of that clause
in the Constitution which calls for uniformity in import duties
throughout the United States, the Chief Justice who wrote the dissent-
llng opinion, cites the case of Loughborough vs Blake 5 Wheat .517.
iHere the court says: "The pov/er, then, to lay and collect duties, im.-
posts and excises may be exercised, and m.ust be exercised, through-
'out the United States. Does this term designate the whole, or any
I
particular portion of the American Empire? Certainly, this question
loan admit of but one ansv/er. It is the name given to our great re-
public, which is composed of states and territories. The District
of Columbia or the territory west of the Missouri, is not less with-
|
jin the United States than Iferyland or Pennsylvania; and it is not
less necessary on the principles of our great constitution, that un-
iformity of imposts, duties and excises should be observed in the one
jthan in the other." i
1
I
This dictum of Chief Justice Marshall would of itself be
sufficient to over-rule the decision of the case under discussion, i
but Justice Brov/n sets it aside with the remark that it holds good
jso far as the District of Columbia is concerned, but further than
Ijthat it has no bearing on the case in hand. We cannot see the force
|
of his reasoning. The ruling of the great Chief Justice has stood
the test of a century, and has been pointed out in many decisions, the
i —=——— =—= II
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fact that an emergency exists is not sufficient cause for the setting
aside of the organic law In any such arbitrary fashion. As Chief
Justice Fuller points out, the levy of duties is a regulation of Com-
merce, geographical, not intrinsic in nature; and the use to which
the duties are put, in the case of Porto Rico, does not make them lo-
cal. The natural meaning of the words must be taken, rather than any
possible interpretation.
,
The second point under consideration is that brought out in
Justice Brown's opinion, that the constitution does not of itself ex-
tend to newly acquired territories, but must be extended there. by
Congress; and that we may thus have territory over v/hich Congress
rules, unhampered by the provisions of that instrument. Much stress
is placed by the learned Justice upon the idea that the American
government is a government of st tes, not territories and states. He
reviews the entire history of the country from the time of the Con-
federation to the present day and thereupon draws the above conclusion
Much importance is given to the idea that the phrase, "or subject to
the jurisdiction thereof" so frequently used in the Constitution, in-
dicates that there is, in the contemplation of that instrument, ter-
ritory which does not form any integral part of the United States.
This phrase is found particularly in the thirteenth amendment and the
idea is put forward that v/ithout it, slavery m.ight have continued in
the territories. The answer of the Chief Justice is simple. He says
that the amendment weuld have operated throughout the whole domain of
the United States even without that phrase; and that it v/as inserted
simply and \!i*iolly out of abundant caution.
j
In regard to the power of Congress to extend the constitu-
tion we wish simply to cite the following quotations from the dissentr-
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Ing opinion In Marbury va Madison 1 Crauch 1S7, 176; "The orlelnal
||
and supreme v/ill organizes the government and assigns to different
li
department s their respective powers. It may stop here, or establish
I
: certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The
government of the United States Is of the latter description. The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited, aiid to v/hat pur-
Ij pose Is that limitation committed to writing. If these limits may, at
any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"
I
Dred Scott vs Sanford 19 How.395, Mr .Just Ice McLean:- "No
•I
powers can be exercised which are prohibited by the Constitution, or
i!
which are contrary to its spirit."
j
Mr .Justice Campbell:- "I look in vain, among the discussions
i
[i
of the time, for the assertion of a supreme sovereignty for Congress
J
over territory then belonging to the United States, or that they
might thereafter a^cquire. I seek In vain for an annunciation that
1'
'|a consolidated power had been inaugurated, v/hose subject comprehended
jan empire, and v/hlch had no discretion but the discretion of Congress.
||
Murphy vs Ramsey 114 U.S.15. "The personal and uivil
I'
rights of the inhabitants of the territories are secured to them, as
ito other citizens, by the principles of constitutional liberty which
restrain all the agencies of government, state and national.Xhelr
political rights are franchises which they hold as privileges in the
ii
^legislative discretion of the Congress of the United States."
If these cases are not a complete and authoritative denial
i,of the position taken by the court in this case, then the popular and
1
common understanding of our political institutions is wrong, and has
been wrong for a hundred years. Justice Harlan, in his separate dis-
senting opinion says; "if the principles thus announced (referring to.
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Justice Browii*! position) should ever receive the sanction of a ma-
Ijority of this court, a radical and mischievous change in our system
iof government will be the result. We will, in that event, pass from
ii
an era of constitutional liberty, guarded and protected by a written
constitution, into an era of legislative absolutism."
It is not to be denied that Congress ha^ large powers over
the territories belonging to the United States. The whole legisla-
tive authority in regard to them and their people is vested in Cong-
ress; but //hat has been said before proves conclusively that this
jpov/er, this authority, is to be exercised always and everywhere under
i
'the direction of the sovereign will of the people as expressed in the
li
Constitution. The day is past when any single person or legislative
Ibody shall unrestrainedly legislate for a people, and especially for
a people totally misrepresented in that body.
The opinion of the court in the case of Downes vs Bidwell
is the opinion of but one judge of that court, and the doctrine there-
jiin set forth should not form a basis for later decisions or for
i governmental acts. But while the doctrine may be rejected, the de-
;i
!l
; cision may not be, since, as has been pointed out, that was concurred
lin by a majority of the court. We thus have a somewhat anomalous re-
'suit; the Philippines and Porto Rico stand in the position of annexed
but incorporated territories, with the precise reason therefor unde-
jtermined. Just \i*iat constitutes incorporation is not yet known,
i though some examples of it will appear later.
With the status of newly acquired territory is indissolubly
I
connected that of the inhabitants thereof. Until 1898, the doctrine
I;
enunciated by Marshall in speaking of the Spanish treaty of 1819, had
j
been the guiding principle of the government in dealing with newly

acquired peoples. He sai(i:# "This treaty is the law of the land , and
li
admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges
rights and immunities of citizens of the United States They do
not however, participate in the political power; they do not share in
the government, till Florida shall become a state."
I
Up until that time also a man was supposed to be either a
citizen of the United States, or an alien. There was no middle
ground. An American citizen was defined by the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution, as one who was either born or naturalized within
the United States, and who was also subject to the Jurisdiction there-
of. Nov/, according to the case Just considered, the natives of Porto
Rico and the Philippines were subject to the Jurisdiction of the
United States, but neither born nor naturalized therein. The mere
,1
ifact of annexation, it was held, did not extend the boundaries of
the home country; that could only take place when incorporation was
effected.
The first case to come before the Supreme Court involving
his question was one arising in the Hawaaian Islands, By Joint
resolution of both houses of Congress, these islands were, on July
yth, 1898, annexed to the United States. This Joint resolution,
r
among other things, contained a provision that all municipal legisla-
tion in force therein, and not inconsistent with the Constitution and
lawET of the United States, should remain in force until Congress
should otherwise determine. On April 4th, 1900, an act was passed
erecting Hawaii into an organized territory and giving to it a ter-
ritorial government. Between these two dates, one Mankichi, a native
0f Hawaii, was tried and convicted of manslaughter and condemned to
life imprisonment. The case was later brought before the Supreme
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Court of the United States on a writ of error, charging that the trial
jihad not been according to law, and urging that the defendant was there
fore entitled to his liberty. The illegality chcirged was that Man-
kichl had been held to trial on an indictment by information, and
that the verdict of the jury was rendered by the consent of nine in-
stead of twelve Jurors. Now, by the constitution as int erpretated
by the Supreme Court, no person shall be held to answer for crime un-
less upon the indictment of a grand jury; and the trial of all crimes
must be by the common law jury of twelve men, with a unanimous ver-
dict. This position has not jpet been opposed, nor was it in this
'lease. 'I
The position taken by the majority of the court was that,
i±f the Constitution applied to Hawaii during the interval from July
7th, 1898 to April 4th, 1900, the trial of Mankichi was illega:iy con-
ducted and therefore void. The contention of the court, however, v/as
i| that the Constitution did not apply ;# "that, in interpreting a sta-
|tute, the intention of the law -making power will prevail even a-
gainst the letter of the statute;" that, "In inserting in the Res-
.olution of July 7th, 1898 annexing Hawaii, a provision that municipal
legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States should remain in force until otherwise determined. Congress
did not intend to impose upon the islands every clause of the Con-
stitution, and to nullify convictions and verdicts, which might, be-
fore the legislature could act, be rendered in accordance with exist-
ing legislation of the islands, but not in accordance with the pro-
:
I
jjvisions of the Constitution, nor was such the intention of Hawaii in
j
I
surrendering its autonomy,"
I
Justices White and McKenna, in a concurring opinion, held
|Uiat the Constitutional provisions were not applicable to Hawaii
|
# 190 U.S.197.

1I
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IjCause that island had not at that time been incorporated into the
United States and made an integral part thereof.
Here again, the difference in opinion was so great that we
J
find a strong dissent expressed, this time by Justice Harlan alone •#
;
His conclusions as summed up by himself are as follows:
-
jl
"I am of the opinion: First, that when the annexation of Hawaii was
completed, the Constitution - without any power of Congress to pre-
:'|vent it - became the supreme law of that country, and therefore, it
forbade the trial and conviction of the accused for murder otherwise
than upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury, and by the unan-
ilmous verdict of a petit jury.
Second: That if the legality of such trial and conviction is to
!| be tested alone by the Joint Resolution of 1898, then the law is
for the accused, because Congress, by that Resolution, abrogated or
l|
forbade the enforcement of any municipal law of Hawaii so far as it
authorized a trial for an infamous crime otherwise than in the mode
prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and that any
other construction of the Resolution is forbidden by its clear, un-
ambiguous words, and is to make, not to interpret the law."
j
He points out very clearly that if the Constitution must be
extended by Congress, then Congress is above the Constitution, a doc-
trine dangerous to and perversive of American free institutions.
I
The position which he takes is upheld in the case of the
iChicago, Rock-IsMnd & Pacific Railway Company v. McGlinn (114 U.S.
I
546) which says:-
1
"As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations
l^n conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitu-
tion of the nev/ government are at once displaced. Thus upon a cession
# 190 U.S.248-249.
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Of political Jurisdiction and legislative power - and the latter is
i! Involved in the former - to the United States, the laws of the coun-
:i
ii try in support of an estal>li3hed religion, or abridging the freedom
I
of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments and the
''like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force wit>iout any dec-
I
ilaration to that effect,"
The court had held that indictment by grand jury, and the
ii
'unanimous verdict of the petit jury were not essential features of
jthe Constitution, but only incidents of judicial prodeedure. Yet the
case of Thompson vs Utah (170 U.S. 543) declared that an act of Con-
gress providing for a trial by a jury of eight persons, in the terri-
Ijtory of UtaV would have been in conflict with the Constitution. Ex
parte Bain (121 U S.l) held that indictment by grand jury was essen-
11
tial to conviction. It is also worthy of note, as Justice Karlan sug-
i
gests, that the question of w' ether these things are fundamental in
i! their nature or not, does not relieve the court of its duty to defend
:'and to maintain the Constitution as it stands.
According to the ruling in this case, Hawaii was merely an
I
annexed territory of the United States, during the period above men-
'tioned, and entirely subject to the will or ^Nhim of a Congress unre-
strained by constitutional provisions. Moreover, there was no reason
I
i why that island could not have been kept in that limbo for a hundred
years or more, in fact indefinitely.
I
We turn next to the Philippine Archipelago .# In his instruc-
tions to the Philippine Commission dated April 7th, 1900, President
'I McKinley made the following statement:-
"Upon every division and branch of the Government of the Phil-
i ippines therefore, must be imposed these Inviolable rules:
-
j
That no person shall be deprived of life
,
liberty or prop-
^
# See"Gompiled Reports" p 9.
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erty without due process of law; that private property shall not be
j|taken for public use v/ithout Just compensation; that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to
be confronted with the witnes es against him, to have compulsory
i!
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assist-
ance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be re-
||
quired, nor excessive fines be Imposed, nor cruel nor unusual pun-
Isliment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense, or to be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreason-
il
able searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for
crimes; that no bill of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall be passed
jthat no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press, or the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition
the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made
ii
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of relig-
ious profession and worship without discrimination or preference
II
Shall forever be allowed."
|i It will be readily seen that this is a repetition of the
bill of rights as found in the Amendments to the Constitution. The
[only exceptions, or rather omissions are the right to trial by jury,
presentment or indictment by grand jury, and the right to bear arms.
These instructions were embodied almost word for word in the act of
jjuly 1st, 1902 providing a civil government for the Islands. The
Supreme Court has, in the case of Dorr vs The United States (195 U.S.,;
I I
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142), denied the right to trial by Jury to an American citizen res-
dont in Manila. It could not do otherwise, in the light of its r il-
ings in the cases above cited; yet we are thus brought face to face
with the fact that the inhabitant of the Philippines, and of Porto
Rico, no matter of what nationality he may be, if accused of crime,
cannot claim the right of trial by Jury. And let him v/ho considers
jjthis right unessential consult the works of Justice Story, the great
constitutional lawyer, where in volume 2, section 1779, he will find
iit stated that our ancestors, from the earliest times, insisted on it
I
"as a great bulwark of their civil and political liberties," The
Supreme Court itself has said # that the right to trial by Jury is a
right "dear to the American people", and has "always been an object
iiof deep interest and solicitude, andevery encroachment upon it has
been watched with great Jealousy."
Because some of the states have denied or abridged this
right is no Justification for the United States to do it through a
legislative act. The rights of the citizens of the separate states
are the special care of the states themselves. The national govern-
ment cannot interfere in the internal affairs of the state except it
be for a national interest. If the states choose to deny this right
to trial by Jury, that is no concern of the national government. But
if the national government chooses to deny that right, let it do so
in the way which the Constitution has provided, by an appeal to the
sovereign people in the same way as the states must do. Otherwise,
li
ilet the Constitution be enforced as it stands, regardless of conse-
I
quences for no price can be put upon American liberties. The doc-
! trine of inexpediency or necessity would certainly put these liber-
I
ties In danger • !
I
On<a ntbftr naftfi nnly r^ni^lnf^ tO be considered^ That is a case
# (Parsons vs Bedford) 5 Pet .446.
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arising in Alaska, In a decision handed down on April 10th, 1905 the
STupreme Court holds that the right to trial by Jury extends to Alaska
land that trials by less than the common law Jury are void. That ter-
ritory has not yet been given the regular form of territorial govern-
ment, hence it stands in a position midway between that of an organ-
ized territory like Hawaii and a territory like Porto Rico to which
the Constitution "has been extended". The reason given by the court
for this decision is that Alaska is an "incorporated" territory and
il
I that the Constitution therefore extends thereto. As evidences of in-
corporation, three facts are cited: First, the text of the treaty
which in Article 3 declares that: "The inhabitants of the ceded ter-
I
liritory shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advan-
il
il
tages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and shall be
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, prop-
j erty and religion". Second: that by the acts of July 20th, 1868, (15
'
Stat .167), and July 27th, 1868 (15 Stat .240), the laws of the United
States relating to customs, coLimerce and navigation v/ere extended
jOver Alaska, and a customs district was established therein. Third:
I
that the territory of Alaska was assigned to the ninth Judicial
circuit by the Judiciary act of March 5rd,1891, (26P;tc..t .826) . The
court seems to have forgotten that the second and third of these facts
at least, are to be found in the case of Porto Rico also, and yet the
latter is not an incorporated territory.
In -iummarizing the results of our investigation v/e find that
I
there are three classes of dependencies of the United States. The
first is the organized, incorporated territory, of v/hich Hawaii is
now an example; the second is the unorganized incorporated territory
1
such as Alaska; the third is the organized unincorporated territory
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^puch as Porto Rico, The Philippine Archipelago, and the Panama Canal
Zone. The incorporated territory is ruled by Congress under the pro-
visions of the Constitution; the unincorporated territory is ruled by
ijJongress also, but the latter body is in this case, held by one Jud^e
at least, to be entirely unhanpored by the Constitution while the re-
mainder of the majority hold that it is bound only by such provisions
pf that instrument as are applicable to the particular case in hand.
There is thus a separate citizenship for Porto Rico, for the
Philippines, and for the Canal Zone. A citizen of one does not ne-
cessarily have a claim for citizenship in the other, and certainly
hot for citizenship in the United States.
II
We would submit it as our conviction therefore, that such a
state of affairs cannot be justified by the precedents of legislative
II
act and Judicial decision previous to the year 1898; that the doctrine
of the government and of the majority of the Supreme Court is danger-
ous to American institutions and American liberties; and Lhat the
rue and safe doctrine is that upheld by the minority of the court,
and which says that the Constitution is the source and life of all
government, and that it is the controlling force wherever the
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the United States extend.
-oOo-
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